

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00086 01 OF 03 060959Z

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0086

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FLANK SECURITY

REF: A) USNATO 10 1057; B) USNATO 1142; C) USNATO 4996 (1974);
D) USNATO 5200 (1974)

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE SUGGESTS A NEW
APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF REACHING ALLIED CONSENSUS
ON THE ISSUE OF FLANK SECURITY. OUR SUGGESTED APPROACH
WOULD BE TO SEPARATE THE ISSUE OF HOW TO DEAL WITH
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00086 01 OF 03 060959Z

HUNGARY UNDER A PHASE I AGREEMENT FROM THE ISSUE OF

HOW TO SATISFY GREEK AND TURKISH DESIRE FOR TREATY LANGUAGE THAT WOULD MEET THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS. WE BELIEVE A NEW US INITIATIVE ALONG THESE LINES COULD SERVE TO PREVENT A RENEWED IMPASSE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND HEAD OFF POSSIBLE TURKISH ATTEMPTS TO BLOCK ALLIED CONSENSUS ON OTHER ISSUES OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE US IN ORDER TO EXERT LEVERAGE ON THE FLANK SECURITY PROBLEM.

2. ACTION REQUESTED: WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES REVIEW THE CURRENT US POSITION ON FLANK SECURITY AND CONSIDER A NEW US INITIATIVE ALONG THE LINES SET OUT IN PARAS 12-19 BELOW. IF A REVIEW IS DECIDED ON, USNATO COULD INFORM TURKISH AND OTHER INTERESTED MISSIONS THAT THE US WAS REVIEWING ITS POSITION AND PREFERRED TO DEFER SPC CONSIDERATIONS OF FLANK SECURITY FOR A FEW WEEKS. IF THE US IS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE SOME NEW INITIATIVES ON THIS MATTER, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HOLD IT IN ABEYANCE RATHER THAN RENEW THE SPC IMPASSE. END SUMMARY.

3. CONVERSATIONS WITH FLANK DELEGATIONS HERE SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION IN USNATO 1057 THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE OF SUBSTANCE ON THE ISSUE OF FLANK SECURITY SINCE THE SPC DROPPED THE MATTER LAST SEPTEMBER. WE CONSIDER THAT USNATO IS CORRECT IN PREDICTING THAT A RENEWED SPC DISCUSSION OF FLANK SECURITY ALONG THE LINES PURSUED LAST SUMMER WOULD MERELY LEAD TO A REPETITION OF LAST SEPTEMBER'S IMPASSE AND WOULD NOT SATISFY FLANK REQUIREMENTS. MOREOVER, THE INCREASED DELICACY OF US-TURKISH BILATERAL RELATIONS SINCE SEPTEMBER PROVIDES ANOTHER REASON WHY WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE FRUITLESS DISCUSSION OF THE FLANK SECURITY ISSUE.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, WE AGREE WITH PARA 8 OF USNATO 1057 THAT PROGRESS ON PROVIDING AGREED GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP ON FLANK SECURITY ISSUES WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE US. SPECIFICALLY, IF THE ALLIANCE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00086 01 OF 03 060959Z

SHOULD IN THE FUTURE DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCING OPTION 3 INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD EXPECT SOME OF THE FLANK PARTICIPANTS, AMONG THEM THE TURKS, TO WITHHOLD THEIR APPROVAL OF OPTION 3 UNTIL AFTER THEY HAVE RECEIVED SOME SATISFACTION THROUGH THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIANCE POSITION OF FLANK SECURITY. PREVIOUS TURKISH COMMENTS ABOUT OPTION 3 HAVE LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR THEM TO DO SO.

IN THIS CONTEXT, USNATO 1057 POINTS OUT THAT THE TURKS HAVE ALREADY RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF US AIR MANPOWER PROPOSALS TO FLANK SECURITY. FOR ALL OF THE ABOVE REASONS, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE US TO TAKE A NEW INITIATIVE NOW ON THIS ISSUE.

5. THE DELEGATION DOUBTS THAT THE TACTIC SUGGESTED IN PARA 9 OF USNATO 1057, TO APPROACH ITALY WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE HUNGARY QUESTION BE HANDLED THROUGH NON-CIRCUMVENTION, WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IN BREAKING THE PRESENT IMPASSE. THE PRINCIPAL ITALIAN CONCERN IS TO ENSURE THAT, WHATEVER CONSTRAINTS MAY BE APPLIED TO HUNGARY, THESE CONSTRAINTS DO NOT REPEAT NOT APPLY TO ITALY AS WELL. THE EFFECT OF THE ITALIAN LANGUAGE ON FLANKS (IN USNATO 5200), BY ITS REFERENCE TO AREAS "ADJACENT" TO THE REDUCTION AREA, WOULD BE TO EXCLUDE ITALY. THE ITALIANS ARE UNLIKELY TO DROP THIS LANGUAGE UNLESS THEY ARE ASSURED THAT THE ALLIES WILL SEEK A FORMULA WHICH EFFECTIVELY PROTECTS ITALY FROM INCLUSION.

6. WE SUGGEST THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MOST EFFECTIVE COURSE FOR THE US MIGHT BE TO PROPOSE TO SEPARATE THE FLANK SECURITY ISSUE FROM THE HUNGARY ISSUE, AND TO HANDLE EACH INDIVIDUALLY IN FORMULATIONS TAILORED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE PURPOSE.

7. ON THE FLANK SECURITY ISSUE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT AGREE TO A MODIFICATION OF THE BELGIAN

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00086 02 OF 03 061018Z

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 USIE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

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AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0086

FROM US REP MBFR

PROPOSAL (IN USNATO 5200) ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES;
"THE US AND USSR WOULD AGREE NOT TO REDEPLOY FORCES
WITHDRAWN UNDER THE (MBFR PHASE I) AGREEMENT IN SUCH
A WAY AS TO DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THOSE STATES WHO
PARTICIPATED IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WITH A SPECIAL
STATUS." THE DRAFT US PROPOSAL BELOW CONTAINS
AGUMENTS WHICH COULD BE USED IN SUPPORT OF THIS
POSITION.

8. ON THE HUNGARY ISSUE, WE BELIEVE THAT ALLIES MIGHT
AGREE TO A PROPOSAL ALONG THE LINES THAT "THE US AND
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00086 02 OF 03 061018Z

USSR AGREE NOT TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE LEVEL OF
THEIR COMBAT FORCES STATIONED IN ANY COUNTRY WHICH
PARTICIPATED IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WITH A
SPECIAL STATUS AND IS ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUC-
TIONS." THIS MODIFICATION OF THE ITALIAN APPROACH OF
LAST SUMMER WOULD CLEARLY COVER HUNGARY WITHOUT
COVERING ITALY, THUS MEETING ITALIAN CONCERNS. THIS
FORMULATION WOULD ALSO HAVE THE EFFECT OF IMPOSING
LIMITATIONS ON INCREASES OF US FORCES IN DENMARK.

9. ALTHOUGH SUCH A PROVISION WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST
OF THE ALLIES, WE DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE
TO THE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO FEEL THAT
FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR THEM IN HUNGARY IS OF GREATER
IMPORTANCE THAN US FREEDOM OF ACTION IN DEMARK. IN
THAT CASE THE ALLIES WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
RISKING A STALEMATE ON THIS ISSUE AND MAKING A
BETTER OFFER. THE LOGICAL FALLBACK, WHICH IS

EMBODIED IN THE ITALIAN LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN USNATO 5200, WOULD BE TO EXTEND THE PROVISION TO COVER ALL COUNTRIES ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS RATHER THAN MERELY THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS ADJACENT TO THE AAREA. THIS VARIANT WOULD RESTRICT FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES IN FRANCE AS WELL AS DENMARK, AND HENCE WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLY GREATER NEGOTIATING WEIGHT. WE HAVE FORMULATED THE PROVISION IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH TO APPLY ONLY TO "COMBAT" FORCES SO THAT IF IT SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO COVER FRENCH TERRITORY, IT WOULD STILL NOT PRECLUDE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A US LOC THROUGH FRANCE IF THE FRENCH SHOULD AGREE IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, A FORMULATION WHICH APPLIED TO ALL COUNTRIES ADJACENT TO THE AREA WOULD REMOVE THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN THE FUTURE, GIVEN A FRENCH CHANGE OF POLICY, THE US MIGHT DEPLOY COMBAT AIRCRAFT TO FRENCH AS WE DID BEFORE 1967. THE DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES WOULD WANT TO STUDY VERY CAREFULLY THE IMPLICATIONS OF A "HUNGARY CLAUSE" WHICH RESTRICTED US DEPLOYMENTS IN FRANCE, AND THEREFORE THAT THE US SHOULD NOT PROPOSE IT IN THE SPEC AT THE PRESENT TIME. EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, THE US WILL NEED TO DECIDE HOW MUCH OF OUR SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00086 02 OF 03 061018Z

OWN FUTURE FLEXIBILITY WE ARE PREPARED TO SACRIFICE IN ORDER TO RESTRICT SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY ON THEIR POSSIBLE ROLE VISA-A-VIS SUCH COUNTRIES AS OURSELVES, ROMANIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA.

10. AS FAR AS TIMING IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE GIVEN REASONS ABOVE WHY SPEEDY ALLIED AGREEMENT WOULD BE USEFUL. WE SEE NO REASON WHY NATO COULD NOT CONSIDER THIS ISSUE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH WORK ON OPTION III. INDEED, IF THE SPC RECEIVES IN MARCH A NEW US PROPOSAL ON FLANK SECURITY AND HUNGARY, THE FLANK STATES SHOULD BE MORE WILLING TO SUPPORT A US SUGGESTION THAT OPTION III BE CONSIDERED EXPEDITIOUSLY BY THE PERMANENTS THEMSELVES.

11. AS A BASIS FOR CONSIDERATION OF THIS SUGGESTED APPROACH BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES, THERE FOLLOWS THE DRAFT TEXT OF A PAPER WHICH THE US MIGHT CIRCULATE IN THE SPEC.

BEGIN TEXT.

MBFR: FLANK SECURITY

12. IN RECENT MONTHS, THE SPEC HAS SET ASIDE ITS

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF FLANK SECURITY IN MBFR, HAVING BEEN UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY ISD/80 (2ND REVISE). THE US GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THIS ISSUE MIGHT BE MORE READILY RESOLVED THROUGH A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT APPROACH, WHICH WOULD SEPARATE THE ISSUES OF HUNGARY AND OF FLANK SECURITY. WHAT IS NEEDED AT THIS TIME IS CLEAR GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ALLIED POSITION. THE AD HOC GROUP WOULD, IN TURN, PRESENT THOSE IDEAS TO THE EAST AND WORK TOWARDS OBTAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE. WE CONSIDER THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO DRAFT "TREATY LANGUAGE."

13. WHEN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS REACH THE TREATY-DRAFTING STAGE, IT MAY PROVE DESIRABLE TO BRING THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00086 02 OF 03 061018Z

POINTS RELATING TO FLANK SECURITY INTO CONNECTION WITH A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE. HOWEVER, AT THIS POINT, THE TASK OF THE ALLIES IS TO DEFINE AND PURSUE THE SUBSTANCE OF ALLIES SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, RATHER THAN TO FIX THE FORM IN WHICH THIS SUBSTANCE CAN BEST BE EXPRESSED. WHEN ADVANCING THESE POSITIONS, THE AD HOC GROUP WOULD THEREFORE SIMPLY MAINTAIN THE EXISTING ALLIED POSITION THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE NECESSARY.

14. FLANK SECURITY. THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE TO THE EAST THAT THERE WOULD BE AN EXPLICIT AGREEMENT THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD "NOT REDEPLOY THE FORCE WITHDRAWN UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DIMINISH

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00086 03 OF 03 061034Z

12
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

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AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0086

FROM US REP MBFR

THE SECURITY OF THOSE STATES WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WITH A SPECIAL STATUS.Z THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT SEEK TO DEFINE MORE SPECIFICALLY, BY UNILATERAL STATEMENTS OR OTHERWISE, WHAT WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED BY SUCH A CLAUSE. FURTHER SPECIFICITY COULD JEOPARDIZE THE FREEDOM OF ACTION WHICH NATO FORCES MAY REQUIRE IN FLANK AREA. FURTHERMORE, THE CLAUSE AS STATED HERE CLEARLY IMPLIES RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET FORCES IN SOVIET TERRITORY, AND THESE RESTRICTIONS WOULD BE NON-NEGOTIABLE IF THEY WERE EXPLICIT.

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00086 03 OF 03 061034Z

15. THIS APPROACH WOULD:

-- PROTECT THE FUNDAMENTAL ALLIED INTEREST, WHICH IS TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT THE ALLIES CONTINUE TO REGARD THEIR SECURITY AS INDIVISIBLE, AND THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE CENTRAL REGION IF THE PROCESS OF DOING SO DIMINISHES SECURITY ON THE FLANKS.

-- AVOID THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL GEOGRAPHIC

REGION WITHIN WHICH MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS WERE NECESSARILY SUSPECT. THIS IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE ALLIES CANNOT AFFORD A SITUATION IN WHICH POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF US FORCES IN THE FLANK REGIONS (WHETHER UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE ACE MOBILE FORCES OR OTHERWISE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SOVIET PROTEST. WE NOTE IN PASSING THAT THIS FORMULATION WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITY -- THIS CLAUSE WOULD IN NO WAY RESTRICT ALLIED FORCES ON THE NORTHER FLANK SINCE THERE ARE NO EASTERN SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS THERE WHOSE SECURITY MIGHT BE DIMINISHED, WHILE IT WOULD PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM REDEPLOYING WITHDRAWN FORCES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO THREATEN NORWAY.

-- IMPLICITLY PLACE A RESTRICTION UPON SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN SOVIET TERRITORY. WHILE THE SOVIETS MIGHT ACCEPT IT WITH THE IDEA THAT THEY WOULD NOT IN ANY EVENT WISH TO DEPLOY THEIR WITHDRAWN FORCES ON THE FLANKS, IT WOULD GIVE THE ALLIES GROUNDS TO OBJECT IF SOVIET REDEPLOYMENTS SERIOUSLY MENACED OUR FLANKS.

-- AVOID SPECIFYING ANY PARTICULAR ACTION WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD NOT TAKE, AND THUS NOT (BY ARGUMENT A CONTRARIO) APPEAR TO SANCTION SOME LESSER BUT STILL UNDESIRABLE SOVIET MOVES.

16. HUNGARY. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD CONTAIN A CLAUSE PLEDGING THE US AND USSR NOT TO "SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE LEVEL OF THEIR COMBAT FORCES STATIONED IN ANY COUNTRY WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE VIENNA
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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00086 03 OF 03 061034Z

NEGOTIATIONS WITH A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS." THE MAIN COST TO THE ALLIES (AND BENEFIT TO THE SOVIETS) IS THAT THIS CLAUSE WOULD PROHIBIT THE STATIONING OF SUBSTANTIAL US FORCES IN DENMARK. WE CONSIDER THIS TO BE ACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF MILITARY SECURITY.

17. THIS APPROACH WOULD CLEARLY PREVENT A MAJOR SOVIET OFFENSIVE BUILD-UP IN HUNGARY, AND WOULD THUS PROTECT ALLIED INTERESTS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD NOT MENTION HUNGARY BY NAME, AND IT WOULD NOT IMPLY ANY NECESSITY FOR HUNGARY TO BECOME A DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FORMULA WOULD NOT GIVE THE EAST LEGITIMATE GROUNDS TO SEEK TO BRING IN ANY WESTERN FLANK PARTICIPATION. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS CLAUSE, LIKE THE REST OF MBFR, DOES NOT APPLY TO NAVAL FORCES.

18. IN TERMS OF MILITARY REALITIES, A PROHIBITION AGAINST A MAJOR SOVIET BUILD-UP IN HUNGARY IS ALSO A MEASURE OF PROTECTION FOR NATO'S SOUTHER FLANK. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT ON TACTICAL GROUNDS THIS LINK SHOULDN'T BE MADE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST. TO DO SO WOULD PROBABLY LEAD THE EAST TO REASSERT ITS PREVIOUS POLICY OF LINKING HUNGARY WITH ITALY, OR TO SEEK SOME SORT OF FREEZE ON ALLIED FORCE LEVELS IN OUR OWN FLANK COUNTRIES.

19. THE ALLIES SHOULD PRESENT THIS PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIETS STRICTLY AS AN ADJUNCT OF US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES COULD NOT ACCEPT A BROADENING OF THIS CONCEPT TO AFFECT THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, SINCE THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION.
END TEXT.RESOR

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